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Abstract 
Bank payouts divert cash to shareholders, while leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets 
to repay debt holders in the future. Bank payouts, therefore, constitute a type of risk-shifting 
that benefits equity holders at the expense of debt holders. In this paper, we provide insights 
on how incentives stemming from inside debt impact bank payout policy in a manner that 
protects debt holder interests. We show that CEOs with higher inside debt relative to inside 
equity are associated with more conservative bank payout policies. Specifically, CEOs paid 
with more inside debt are more likely to cut payouts and to cut payouts by a larger amount. 
Reductions in payouts occur through a decrease in both dividends and repurchases. Our 
results also hold over a subsample of TARP banks where we expect the link between risk-
shifting and payouts to be of particular relevance because it involves wealth transfers from 
the taxpayer to equity holders. We conclude that inside debt can help in addressing risk-
shifting concerns by aligning the interests of CEOs with those of creditors, regulators, and in 
the case of TARP banks, the taxpayer. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, there has been considerable interest in what determines banks to pursue risky policies. 
This interest stems in part from the historic magnitude of the financial crisis of 2007-09 which 
resulted in substantial losses for bank investors and gave rise to unprecedented levels of 
government support to the banking sector. In an attempt to prevent financial sector meltdown, 
the U.S. government bailed out the banking sector by injecting more than $400 billion of 
taxpayer funds. With taxpayers turned into creditors and exposed to losses resulting from risky 
bank behavior, there has been a great deal of attention on how to prevent excessive bank risk-
taking in the future. Specifically, a prominent question now is how to motivate banks to pursue 
bank policies which protect creditor and taxpayer interests. Our paper looks at this question.  
When banks engage in high levels of risk-taking, it implies a type of risk-shifting that favors 
bank equity holders over debt holders. Risk-shifting favors equity investors because equity 
investors hold convex claims over firm assets which causes their expected payoffs to rise 
exponentially with bank risk; by contrast, debt holder payoffs are concave due to limited upside 
potential in the value of their claims (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). For debt holders, high risk 
taking, therefore, implies a higher probability of losses without the same potential for gains that 
equity holders benefit from. Consequently, it is important to understand how the risk-shifting 
behavior of banks can be mitigated. We examine this issue by focusing on the compensation 
structure of bank CEOs. Specifically, we test whether payments to CEOs of banks that are more 
like debt (than like equity) is associated with bank policies that favor debt holders over equity 
holders. 
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To analyze the link between CEO inside debt and risk-shifting, we explore the case of bank 
payout policy. If banks distribute large payouts to shareholders, they draw down their liquid 
assets and retained earnings, leaving behind riskier and less liquid assets1. Payouts, therefore, 
reduce the quantity and quality of capital available to repay bank debt holders. In this paper, we 
argue that cash disbursements in any form (dividends or repurchases) constitute a form of risk-
shifting that reduces the amount of equity capital available to absorb losses.  
In principle, CEO incentives to pursue risk-shifting are moderated by the compensation 
structure of the CEO (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; John and John, 1993). Consistent with this 
view, various authors have linked equity-based CEO compensation (stock options and firm 
equity) to risky bank policies before the financial crisis (Chen et al., 2006; Mehran and 
Rosenberg, 2007; Minnick et al. 2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013; 
Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). By contrast, little is empirically known about the role of debt-based 
compensation and bank risk-taking2. Applied work has only recently started to explore the 
impact of inside debt on bank risk (e.g. Bolton et al. (2011); Bekkum (2014)). The paucity of 
empirical work on debt-based compensation is particularly unfortunate, given that the value of 
debt-based CEO compensation is often substantial. For instance, the average value of debt-based 
CEO compensation is $6.3 million in our sample, around half the value of equity-based 
compensation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 We define payouts as consisting of cash disbursements to equity holders in the form of cash dividends and share 
repurchases. Since payouts are also commonly referred to as capital distributions in the banking industry, we use 
both terms interchangeably throughout the paper. 
2 The lack of empirical work on debt-based compensation can be partly attributed to the unavailability of reliable 
data on the value of CEO inside debt holdings. Only since 2006 have revised SEC disclosure requirements mandated 
the publication of CEO inside debt holdings in the U.S., including pension benefits, supplemental executive 
retirement plans (SERPs), and total deferred compensation. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) refer to debt-based compensation components (primarily 
defined benefit pension and deferred compensation) as ‘inside debt’. Inside debt holdings align 
CEO and debt holder interests because the value of inside debt, just like the value of debt held by 
outside investors, is sensitive to both the incidence of bankruptcy and the liquidation value of the 
firm in the event of bankruptcy (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and 
Cassell et al. (2012) show for non-financial firms that CEOs with large inside debt claims against 
their firms are more inclined to decrease firm risk and pursue less risky firm investment policies 
to protect the value of their debt holdings. 
Whether changes in payout policy are influenced by incentives stemming from a CEO’s 
inside debt holdings is an important empirical question and the focus of our study. Bank CEOs 
face a trade-off between increasing current payouts (to the benefit of equity holders) and 
preserving/reinvesting cash which could be transferred to debt holders in the event of default. 
Since inside debt holdings are an unsecured firm obligation, inside debt falls in value as bank 
default risk increases, possibly as a result of a higher payout to shareholders. Thus, the 
compensation structure of CEOs geared towards a higher fraction of inside debt creates a 
disincentive to pay out excess capital to the shareholders. Stated alternatively, we expect CEO 
inside debt to have a negative effect on total payout. 
To test our prediction, we compile CEO compensation data on U.S. publicly listed banks 
during 2007-2011. Observing payout policy choices over this period covers the payout behavior 
by banks from the run-up to the crisis as well as the recovery period. Arguably, banks should 
have reduced their payouts during the run-up to the crisis as this would have made it more likely 
ex ante that they could withstand the crisis. To measure bank payouts, we compute total payouts 
as the total amount of cash distributed to equity holders in the form of cash dividends and stock 
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repurchases. While this measure offers a holistic view of the total cash disbursed to shareholders, 
our analysis also focuses separately on the components of payout, cash dividends and 
repurchases. 
Our findings are as follows. We find that bank CEOs with higher inside debt holdings are 
more likely to cut payouts and cut payouts by a larger magnitude. The results are economically 
significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in our measure of inside debt results in a cut in 
total payouts by 13 basis points (the equivalent of $86 million for the average bank in our 
sample). We also show that our results hold if we use an alternate measure to capture the value 
of CEO inside debt holdings or alternative measures for bank payouts. 
Next, we focus on the subsample of banks which received government support in the form of 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during the recent financial crisis. Under TARP, any 
cash distributed to equity holders by banks after the receipt of TARP funds represents 
subordination of not just creditor but also taxpayer interests. TARP bank payouts are a direct 
transfer of wealth from taxpayers to bank equity holders. We therefore explore the impact of 
TARP on the link between inside debt and bank payouts. To the extent that TARP resulted in 
exacerbating the risk-shifting incentives of bank equity holders (e.g. Duchin and Sosyura (2014); 
Flannery, 2010), we expect inside debt to be more effective in limiting risk-shifting by TARP 
banks in comparison to non-TARP banks. We explore this issue by employing a treatment 
effects model. Our results present evidence that TARP banks where CEOs held a higher amount 
of inside debt reduced payouts by a larger amount than non-TARP banks.  
Finally, we test if the negative association between bank payouts and inside debt is driven by 
either one of the components of bank payouts, namely dividends or repurchases. We find that the 
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reported negative relation between inside debt and payouts is driven by both dividends and 
repurchases. Moreover, we show that there is a positive association between inside debt and the 
cash raised from share issues. Thus, incentives stemming from CEO inside debt holdings reduce 
all forms of cash outflows to shareholders and increase cash inflows from shareholders.  
Our paper makes several contributions. First, we contribute to the literature on the impact of 
CEO compensation structure on bank policies and risk-shifting (e.g. Minnick et al., 2011; 
Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; DeYoung et al., 2013). Our study builds on Bennett et al. 
(2012) who document a negative association between pre-crisis CEO inside debt and bank 
default risk during the crisis and on Bekkum (2014) who reports a negative relation between 
CEO and CFO inside debt in 2006 and measures of subsequent market volatility and tail risk 
during 2007-09. Currently, the topic of inside debt is still a ‘black box’ wherein the mechanisms 
through which inside debt decreases bank risk remain largely unidentified and warrant further 
attention. In this respect, we establish a direct link between inside debt and a specific bank policy 
through which inside debt limits risk-shifting incentives of bank CEOs.  
Second, we contribute to the literature examining the role of compensation incentives as a 
determinant of corporate payout choices. Although prior research has explored the 
compensation–payout link, this research has not accounted for debt-like incentives. Our study 
extends prior research by taking into account the role of inside debt on payout. Thus, we offer a 
novel perspective by introducing a previously unrecognized and important, component of CEO 
compensation to this literature (Fenn and Liang, 2001; Aboody and Kasznik, 2008; Cuny et al., 
2009). More generally, we also contribute to the banking literature by examining payout policies 
(Hirtle, 2004; Boldin and Legget, 1995). To our knowledge, we provide the first comprehensive 
examination of bank payout behavior, by taking into account total payouts rather than separately 
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studying one of the components of total payouts (dividends or repurchases). This is important 
since the risk-shifting literature does not explicitly distinguish cash distribution to shareholders 
in the form of dividends or repurchases (e.g. Kalay, 1982). 
Third, we contribute to an emerging stream of research that studies the impact of debt-based 
compensation (e.g. Sundaram and Yermack, 2007; Cassell et al., 2012). We add to the sparse 
empirical literature to date which supports the theoretical predictions of the role of inside debt in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011). The results we report highlight the 
importance of considering the various components of CEO compensation. Analyzing the effects 
of CEO compensation without considering inside debt holdings is unlikely to give a holistic 
picture of the incentives arising from CEO compensation. 
Finally, our paper contributes to current policy debates over how to pay bank executives 
(Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009; Bolton et al., 2011). Recent U.S. compensation guidelines for 
CEOs and other senior executives at large banks highlight the need for compensation practices to 
ensure that compensation arrangements focus on the long-term stability of banks (Board of 
Governors et al., 2010). In Europe, the Liikanen Report (2012) calls on lawmakers to require that 
the variable compensation schemes of European banks should include a bank’s bonds, thereby, 
turning more bank employees into holders of inside debt. The findings we report in this paper 
demonstrate that inside debt is effective in mitigating risk-shifting incentives, and justify a more 
widespread use of inside debt in managerial compensation contracts. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical foundation 
for conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, or risk-shifting. Section 3 develops 
our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample of banks, measurement of our variables, and 
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descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 then extends our 
analysis to the subsample of TARP banks. Section 7 offers insights on how inside debt affects 
the different components of bank payouts. Section 8 conducts robustness checks. The final 
section concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background 
Agency theory postulates that the existence of debt and outside equity results in conflict between 
both groups of claim holders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The premise of the agency costs 
which result from this conflict is the asymmetric payoff structure of equity and debt holders with 
debt holders having fixed and primary claims on a firm’s assets and equity holders having 
residual claims. Firms incur agency costs of equity when managers do not exert effort and under 
invest in risky but positive net present value projects. Firms incur agency costs of debt when 
managers engage in risk-shifting and increase default risk for the benefit of equity holders and at 
the expense of debt holders.  
The agency costs of debt and the resulting risk-shifting problem are particularly acute for 
banking firms for two reasons. First, the financial safety net acts as a taxpayer-funded put option 
(Merton, 1977). Bank shareholders may maximize the value of this put by engaging in additional 
risk-taking at the expense of bank creditors and the deposit insurer. The extant literature has 
provided ample evidence of moral hazard arising from the safety net as well as from government 
guarantees more generally (e.g., Dewatripont and Triole, 1994; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; 
Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Dam and Koetter, 2012). Second, the option value of the safety net 
increases in firm leverage (Keeley and Furlong, 1990; John et al., 2010; Bebchuk and Spamann, 
2009). Since banks are substantially leveraged and hold less equity than any other major 
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industry, the benefits of risk-shifting are magnified for bank shareholders compared with non-
financial firms. 
In order to address the conflict between shareholders and debt holders and the risk-shifting 
which results from it, Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that managerial wealth should be 
sensitive to both equity and debt claims on the firm. The following section develops hypotheses 
on the incentive effects of CEO holdings of inside debt and equity in mitigating risk-shifting at 
banks. We use the payout policies of banks as a laboratory to examine the relationship between 
pay incentives and risk-shifting. 
3. Hypotheses Development 
Inside debt broadly consists of defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation (Sundaram 
and Yermack, 2007). Its payoff structure resembles that of firm debt because inside debt is made 
up of unfunded and unsecured liabilities of the firm. A key feature of inside debt is that the 
payoff to the CEO depends not only on the incidence of default but also on the liquidation value 
of the firm (Edmans and Liu, 2011). 
Debt-based compensation, therefore, could serve as an effective instrument to mitigate 
shareholder-creditor conflicts. Executives with large inside debt holdings face a trade-off 
between incurring losses on their debt-based wealth and maximizing the value of the safety net 
through risk-shifting (Bolton et al., 2011). As a result, inside debt may help align CEO and 
creditor interests (Wei and Yermack, 2011; Edmans and Liu, 2011; Cassell et al., 2012).  
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that the amount of debt-based compensation held by 
CEOs affects their choice of firm policies. The authors argue that CEOs with large inside debt 
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claims against their firms will choose more conservative firm policies that reduce default risk. 
Consistent with this, Cassell et al. (2012) show that CEOs with high levels of debt-based 
compensation decrease total risk by pursuing conservative investment and financing policies.  
In the same vein, CEO holdings of inside debt may shape the bank payout policies. 
Sundaram and Yermack (2007) and Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that higher debt-based 
compensation may curb excessive cash payouts and other forms of risk-shifting. Since reducing 
bank payouts permits banks to increase their capital buffers via retained earnings, doing so is a 
creditor-friendly policy. By contrast, higher levels of payouts deplete banks of some of the most 
liquid and safe assets (cash), thus, increasing bank risk and shifting risk on to debt holders 
(Acharya et al., 2013). We therefore expect bank CEOs with sizable inside debt holdings to be 
more likely to reduce bank payouts. Our hypothesis is that CEOs at banks paid with a higher 
proportion of inside debt will be more likely to reduce payouts (and reduce payouts by a larger 
magnitude) than CEOs paid with a lower proportion inside debt. 
4. Data and Variables 
Our study relies on compensation data which we extract from Compustat’s Execucomp 
database between 2007 and 2011. Our sample starts in 2007, because data on the value of CEO 
inside debt compensation started to become publicly available only after 2006 (as mandated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission [SEC]). We match the compensation data with 
quarterly FR Y-9C reports filed with the Federal Reserve and CRSP to obtain bank accounting 
data and stock return data, respectively. By stipulating that firms file FR Y-9C reports, our 
sample contains commercial banks with unambiguous access to the financial safety (such as 
deposit insurance or liquidity support). Our initial sample size is 403 bank-year observations. To 
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ensure universal coverage of the 50 largest U.S. banks (by assets), we hand-collect missing 
compensation data from proxy statements (form DEF-14A) filed with the SEC for the 50 largest 
banks. Our sample contains 442 bank-year observations and a total of 103 banks.  
4.1. Dependent Variables: Cash Distributions to Shareholders 
The focus of our paper is on cash distributions to equity holders, which can take the form of cash 
dividends and share repurchases. To account for both forms of payouts, we use an aggregate 
measure which we call ‘total payouts’ and which is the sum of cash dividends and repurchases.  
While total payout captures the total cash outflow to equity holders, Boudoukh et al. (2007) 
suggest the need to offset cash inflows from equity holders in the form of seasoned equity 
offerings against payouts to arrive at a more holistic measure of the net cash distributions to 
shareholders. We define ‘net payouts’ as the sum of cash dividends and repurchases minus any 
cash proceeds from equity issues. This is consistent with Cuny et al.’s (2009) definition of net 
payouts. Following Gaspar et al. (2012), we extract data on share repurchases from Compustat, 
while data on the proceeds of equity issues and cash dividends is available from FR-Y 9C 
reports. 
We examine payout behavior through two key variables: the likelihood to change payout and 
the magnitude of a change in payout. The first is a dummy variable ‘∆Payouts≥0’. This measure 
takes the value one if the change in payouts (both total payouts and net payouts) was non-
negative (i.e. no reduction took place), and zero if the change was negative (i.e. a reduction in 
payouts took place). Our second measure is the magnitude of the change in payout (both total 
payouts and net payouts), scaled by the book value of assets in the prior year.   
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4.2. CEO Inside Debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011) suggest measuring managerial 
incentives linked to inside debt via the CEO’s debt-based relative to equity-based compensation 
scaled by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio. The rationale behind this CEO-bank debt-to-equity ratio 
is that, at a value of one, CEO incentives are perfectly aligned with debt and equity holders. If 
the ratio is larger than one, CEO incentives are more aligned with debt holders than with equity 
holders. Following Cassell et al. (2012) and others, we measure the strength of debt-based 
incentives as the ratio of CEO debt-based compensation to equity-based compensation divided 
by bank debt-to-equity ratio and take its natural logarithmic transformation. For ease of 
interpretation, we refer to this logarithmic transformation as CEO-bank debt-to-equity. 
We measure total debt-based compensation as the sum of the present value of accumulated 
pension benefits (both qualified and non-qualified) and deferred cash compensation. 
Consolidated data on pension benefits and deferred compensation is available from annually 
filed DEF 14A proxy statements with the SEC. Equity-based compensation includes the sum of 
the value of CEO equity holdings (including restricted stock) and the Black-Scholes value of 
stock options. The value of stock held is calculated by multiplying the number of shares (sum of 
common stock and restricted stock) by the stock-price at the year-end.  
Since the decision to declare capital distributions is a flow variable, we use one-year lagged 
values of CEO compensation incentives while using contemporaneous control variables (as in 
Cuny et al., 2009). This helps establish a causal link between the corporate decision and 
executive incentives. As put forward in our hypothesis, we expect higher values of the CEO-
bank debt-to-equity (i.e. higher inside debt) to be negatively associated with bank payouts. 
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4.3. Control Variables 
Research on CEO compensation has shown that higher inside equity, in the form of options and 
stock grants, also shapes CEO incentives to engage in risk-shifting. The asymmetric payoff 
structure of options encourages CEOs to make risk increasing corporate decisions (Guay, 1999; 
Coles et al., 2006), whereas, due to their linear payoff structure, stock grants cause CEOs to 
become relatively more risk-averse (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
To measure the incentives created by CEO inside equity, we value the CEO wealth 
components that are sensitive to changes in bank risk through ‘Vega’ incentives and CEO wealth 
components that are sensitive to changes in stock performance through ‘Delta’ incentives. Vega 
acts as a risk incentive since the payoff to CEOs increases with higher firm risk, while Delta acts 
as performance incentive since it results in exposing CEO wealth to changes in stock price. 
Following Liu and Mauer (2011), we scale Vega and Delta by total CEO compensation. This 
helps capture the relative importance of each component with respect to total compensation. 
More details on how we calculate Vega and Delta are provided in Appendix A. 
The literature on the determinants of payout policy (for both non-financial firms and banks) 
provides us with various other control variables. For instance, the probability of distributing cash 
to equity holders has been shown to depend on firm size, profitability, and a firm’s growth 
opportunities (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 2006; for banks: Dickens et al., 2003; 
Boldin and Leggett, 1995). We capture these controls through size (log of total assets), 
profitability (return on equity), and charter value (market value of equity/book value of equity), 
respectively. Further, the amount of cash held by the firm can affect payout policies, although, 
the direction of such a relationship is ambiguous since higher cash may indicate excess cash or a 
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buffer to fund future projects (DeAngelo et al., 2006). We include this through cash (total 
cash/assets). Casey and Dickens (2000) and Dickens et al. (2003) argue that banks with more 
equity (that is, lower leverage) will be more likely to be permitted by regulators to continue 
declaring dividends. Hence, we also include leverage (book value of liabilities/market value of 
equity), as in Jagtiani et al., (2002) and Brewer and Jagtiani (2013), in our models. 
The literature also documents that a key component of payout, dividends, is affected by the 
level of firm risk (Chay and Suh, 2009; Akhigbe and Whyte, 2012). This is because firms facing 
higher income uncertainty may reduce payouts to preserve cash for meeting future firm needs 
(Chay and Suh, 2009). Since payouts result in reducing the quality of bank’s asset portfolio, we 
focus on a proxy which is able to give us an assessment of the current level of bank portfolio 
risk. Following Ronn and Verma (1986), we arrive at a market-based measure of portfolio risk, 
calculated as the standard deviation of the market value of the bank’s assets. Portfolio risk acts as 
a better measure to capture asset and liability returns, while avoiding a mechanical relationship 
with the amount of bank capital (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). Other risk measures (e.g. Z-
score) are influenced by the level of capitalization due to which they may not be able to capture 
the fall in quality of bank assets and may simply reflect the impact of payouts on capitalization. 
In addition to this, book-based measures of risk are often backward looking. The procedure to 
calculate portfolio risk (asset volatility) is outlined in Appendix B.  
Next, we control for CEO age. Older CEOs have been found to be more risk-averse (Bennett 
et al., 2012) and may be more likely to cut payouts as a result. Finally, when assessing the 
determinants of changes in payouts, it is also important to account for the historical trend in 
payouts (Hirtle, 2004; Brav et al., 2005; Aboody and Kasznik, 2008). This is because changes in 
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bank payouts tend to be sticky in nature and are likely to be affected by past changes in payout 
levels. Thus, we include a measure of the lagged change in bank payouts.  
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
To gain some initial insights on the trends in bank capital distributions, we plot the amount of 
bank payouts over the period 2007 – 2011. Figure 1 shows the cash distributions in the form of 
dividends and repurchases to shareholders by our sample banks. The graph highlights that banks 
use both dividends and repurchases as a means to distribute capital to shareholders and that the 
composition of payouts varies over time. This indicates the importance of taking into account 
both share repurchases and dividends when considering bank payouts.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
The descriptive statistics for our sample banks are shown in Table 1. With regard to our 
primary variable of interest, CEOs hold substantial amount of inside debt relative to their equity-
based compensation with the average CEO debt-to-equity ratio being 0.567. The average CEO-
bank debt-to-equity is 0.076, indicating that bank CEOs are more equity-incentivized but inside 
debt makes up a significant proportion of CEO wealth. Furthermore, we note that inside debt is 
heterogeneous across CEOs.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
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5. Empirical Results: Inside Debt and Payout Policy 
5.1. Probability of Reduction in Payout 
We begin our analysis by testing the hypothesis that debt-based CEO compensation is associated 
with an increased likelihood of a cut in payouts. The model specification employed to test the 
hypotheses is as follows: 
 
∆Payout≥0 = ß1 + ß2 CEO-bank debt-to-equityit-1 + ß3 Vegait-1+ ß4 Deltait-1 + ß5 Sizeit + ß6 
Profitabilityit + ß7 Charter Valueit + ß8 Cashit + ß9 Leverageit + ß10 Riskit + ß10 CEO Ageit + F t + 
εit,            (1) 
 
where the dependent variable ∆Payout≥0 takes a value one if the change in payouts was non-
negative over the last year, and zero if the change in payouts was negative. Thus, a negative 
coefficient would indicate that the independent variable is associated with an increased 
likelihood of a cut in payouts. Columns (1) to (4) test our hypotheses by modeling an increase in 
total payouts and the results in columns (5) to (8) are estimated using an increase in net payouts. 
With regard to our primary variable of interest, we focus on incentives due to inside debt through 
CEO-bank debt-to-equity. The results are reported in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Our key finding is that, after controlling for various bank level variables, the CEO-bank debt-
to-equity ratio is a determinant of a bank’s payout policy. Increasing a CEO’s debt-based 
compensation increases the likelihood of a payout cut. The results are also significant in an 
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economic sense. Increasing the CEO-bank debt-to-equity ratio by one standard deviation, results 
in increasing the probability of a payout cut by 6.3% (net payouts: 7.5%). 
The signs on the control variables are consistent with prior studies that explore the 
determinants of firm payout policies. We find that higher profitability decreases the probability 
of a payout cut. Banks having higher charter value are more likely to reduce payouts, consistent 
with Keeley’s (1990) prediction that bank risk-taking is inversely related to the benefits from 
retaining a valuable bank charter. Banks holding higher cash are less likely to decrease payouts 
while higher leverage increases the probability of dividend cut. Finally, we note that our measure 
of lagged change in bank payouts is also significant, consistent with prior literature arguing for 
the need to account for historical changes in payouts. 
5.2. Magnitude of Change in Payout 
In the previous section, we established that CEO compensation affects the decision whether 
or not to cut payouts. However, if debt-based compensation were only to cause a small reduction 
in payouts relative to bank assets, the type of asset substitution and risk-shifting that results when 
banks distribute cash to equity holders would still be present. In this section, we analyze whether 
CEOs with higher inside debt incentives are more likely to cut payouts by a larger amount.  
The dependent variable is the USD change in payouts standardized by the book value of 
assets in the prior year. We scale the change in payouts by assets, because the focus of our 
investigation is on the asset substitution effects towards riskier assets when banks continue to 
declare payouts. It is this asset substitution which causes the risk-shifting which we analyze in 
this paper. The model is as follows: 
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(USD Change in Payouts)/Total Assetsit-1 = ß1 + ß2 CEO-bank debt-to-equityit-1 + ß3 Vegait-1 + ß4 
Deltait-1 + ß5Sizeit +ß6 Profitabilityit +ß7 Charter Valueit + ß8 Cashit + ß9 Leverageit + ß10 Riskit + 
ß11 CEO Ageit + ß12 Δ(Payouts)it-1 + F t + εit      (2) 
 
The regression results are shown in Table 3. Broadly, the results are consistent with the 
results in our previous section. The CEO-bank debt-to-equity ratio enters negatively and is 
statistically significant. Thus, a higher CEO-bank debt-to-equity ratio is associated with a larger 
reduction in payouts. The relationship is also significant in an economic sense. A one standard 
deviation increase in the ratio increases the magnitude of a payout cut by 13 basis points (or $86 
million on average) when considering total payouts and by 20 basis points (or $130 million on 
average3) when considering net payouts. Clearly, CEO inside debt plays a significant role in 
limiting the amount of capital distributions and protecting creditor losses through an increased 
capital buffer. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Overall, our results show that higher CEO debt-based compensation mitigates risk-shifting. 
The coefficients on CEO Vega and Delta incentives do not enter significantly, while charter 
value is associated with a reduction and profitability is associated with an increase in bank 
payouts. We also note that leverage is associated with a decrease in the magnitude of bank 
payouts.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3We calculate the economic significance by standardizing the coefficient of inside debt (i.e. we multiply the 
regression coefficient by the standard deviation of inside debt) and multiplying this by the amount of assets held by 
an average bank in our sample.  
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6. Inside Debt and Payout Policy: Evidence from TARP banks 
The evidence in the previous section indicates that inside debt holdings are associated with 
more conservative bank payout policies. In this section, we test if inside debt remains effective at 
limiting risk-shifting at banks which were bailed out during the recent financial crisis. 
The financial crisis which started in 2007 resulted in widespread bailouts of the banking 
industry. In one of its largest efforts to stabilize the financial sector, the U.S. government 
initiated the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), a taxpayer-funded capital assistance 
program for crisis-affected financial firms. It is a frequently raised concern that TARP, by 
extending the financial safety net, has encouraged additional bank risk-taking (Flannery, 2010). 
Consistent with this view, recent evidence suggests that TARP banks have indeed approved 
riskier loans (Black and Hazelwood, 2013) and shifted investment portfolios toward riskier 
securities (Duchin and Sosyura, 2014). In our case, payouts by TARP banks also represent a type 
of risk-shifting. Any cash distributed by banks after the receipt of TARP funds to equity holders 
represents a subordination of creditor and taxpayer interests. Thus, we exploit the payout policies 
of TARP banks as a natural experiment to assess the effectiveness of inside debt to constrain 
additional risk taking by TARP banks after they received state support. 
However, in contrast to the risk-shifting argument, it can be argued that payouts by some 
TARP banks were justified on the grounds that these banks were financially healthy. For 
instance, payouts by TARP banks may act as a signal to shareholders about the financial status of 
the institution. Furthermore, TARP banks may declare payouts to reduce the costs of raising 
capital in the future or to improve their valuation. In this section, we test if TARP moderates the 
effect of inside debt on bank payouts. 
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TARP provides a unique setting to conduct an empirical assessment of the impact of bailouts on 
risk-taking, and more generally, the effectiveness of inside debt in mitigating additional risk-
taking concerns. Extant research on TARP has shown that TARP banks engaged in additional 
risk-taking (e.g. Duchin and Sosyura (2014); Black and Hazelwood (2013)). If this is the case, 
we should expect a stronger role of inside debt in mitigating such concerns. We assess this issue 
here.  
We begin our analysis by first conducting a simple interaction term analysis and then a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) treatments effects model to control for potential endogeneity around 
the allocation of TARP funds (as in Duchin and Sosyura, 2014; Berger and Roman, 2013). The 
results are reported in Table 4. As previously, the dependent variable is a binary variable that 
takes the value one if the change in payouts was non-negative (in models 1-4) and the magnitude 
of a change in payouts (in models 5-10). Our primary variable of interest is the TARP dummy 
which captures the impact of TARP on our dependent variable. Further, we assess the impact of 
TARP on the relation between inside debt and bank payouts through our interaction term 
between TARP and CEO inside debt holdings. Our control variables remain as before.  
The allocation of TARP funds is not a random and exogenous process. For instance, 
Bayatizova and Shivdasani (2012) show that TARP recipients were financially healthy banks 
relative to non-TARP banks. This could lead to a spurious relationship between TARP and bank 
payouts since healthy banks facing short-term liquidity during the crisis may declare lower 
payouts. Thus, it is not TARP but short-term illiquidity that may have resulted in a change in 
payout behavior. Therefore, if we were to use a simple interaction terms analysis to estimate how 
the receipts of TARP funds moderates the effect of inside debt, the results may be misleading.  
Because of the potential endogeneity surrounding the receipt of TARP funds, we conduct an 
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instrumental variable analysis to isolate the causal impact of TARP on bank payouts. As a first 
step in this direction, we identify instrumental variables that affect the decision to receive TARP 
but do not materially impact bank payouts. 
We follow prior literature to identify three instruments based on banks’ geographic location 
and political connectedness (Duchin and Sosyura (2014); Li (2013); Berger and Roman (2013)). 
As in Duchin and Sosyura (2014), we use a bank’s campaign contributions to members of the 
Financial Institutions and Capital Markets sub-committees of the House Financial Services 
Committee for the 2008 congressional election. We standardize the campaign contributions by 
bank assets and call this instrument %FIRE Contributions. Second, we establish how many 
representatives who sat on either of the two sub-committees represented the congressional 
district where the bank was headquartered. We call this instrument Political Connections.4 
Lastly, Bayatizova and Shivdasani (2012) show that the geographic location of banks may affect 
the receipt of TARP funds, with banks in more severely affected regions having a higher 
likelihood to receive TARP. We compute changes in the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s state 
coincident index from December 2007 to October 2008, weighted according to a bank’ share of 
deposits in a given state. We call this instrument State Macro Index Growth. The results of this 
first-stage estimation procedure are provided in Appendix C.  
To implement the first-stage of the 2SLS approach, we identify the determinants of TARP 
approval by using a binary-choice model where the dependent variable is whether the bank was 
under TARP (i.e. received TARP funds) or not. The predicted likelihood of receiving TARP 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Both sub-committees played a key role in the drafting and allocation process of TARP funds. Higher contributions 
and more political connections will allow banks to exert a stronger influence on sub-committee members. Data for 
campaign contributions and district representation are from the Center for Responsive Politics and the Congress 
online database, respectively. 
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funds from the first-stage enters the second-stage regression (where our dependent variable is 
bank payouts). The results of our two-stage estimation framework are shown in Table 4 which 
control for endogeneity around the TARP approval process. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
After controlling for the endogeneity of TARP Table 4, we continue to find that inside debt 
resulted in decreasing bank payouts. However, the coefficient on TARP is no longer significant 
which means that, after controlling for the factors that cause banks to receive TARP funds, 
TARP banks do not declare fewer payouts. This underlines the importance of using a 2SLS 
model which controls for endogeneity around TARP rather than the simple interaction analysis. 
Further, the coefficient on the interaction term between TARP × CEO-bank debt-to-equity ratio 
is significant when we model the level of total payouts by banks. Taken together, we find some 
evidence that TARP strengthened the link between payouts and inside debt. Inside debt was 
more effective in limiting payouts for TARP banks compared to non-TARP banks. However, this 
finding holds for total payouts and not for net payouts. 
7. Inside Debt holdings and Bank Capital Distributions:  
Dividends, Repurchases, and Equity Issues 
Our primary empirical analyses show a negative association between bank payouts and CEO 
inside debt holdings. However, this approach does not take into consideration the potential 
impact of inside debt on the different components of bank payouts, i.e. dividends and 
repurchases. It is important to look at this issue. The literature has shown some evidence of a 
substitution effect between dividends and repurchases (e.g. Fenn and Liang, 2001; Kahle, 2002).  
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It is possible that inside debt results in reducing the level of bank dividends, but part of these 
funds are still distributed in the form of share repurchases. While we may observe a negative 
relationship, inside debt would not be entirely effective in reducing the level of total bank 
payouts since it is not able to mitigate capital distributions in the form of share repurchases. To 
disentangle this effect, we run separate regressions of inside debt on the two components of 
payouts. Additionally, we test the impact of inside debt on the proceeds from new equity issues 
since it is a component of our net payouts variable. This analysis helps determine whether or not 
our findings are driven by a single component or the various components of bank payouts to 
shareholders. 
We begin by running a model specification in which the dependent variable is equal to one if 
the change in the component of payout was non-negative, and zero otherwise. Next, we assess 
the impact of inside debt on the magnitude of change in the payout component. The results are 
shown in Table 5.  
 
∆Payout variables = ß1 + ß2 CEO-bank debt-to-equityit-1 + ß3 Vegait-1 + ß4 Deltait-1 + ß5Sizeit +ß6 
Profitabilityit +ß7 Charter Valueit + ß8 Cashit + ß9 Leverageit + ß10 Riskit + ß11 CEO Ageit + ß12 
Δ(Payout)it-1 + F t + εit          (4) 
 
The coefficients on inside debt have the predicted sign and are statistically significant for 
each of the two components of payout. This indicates that inside debt affects both bank dividends 
and repurchases; we do not find evidence of a reduction in dividends being channeled towards 
repurchases. Equity issues are positively associated with inside debt. Higher equity financing 
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reduces the default risk for debt holders and lowers distress costs (Mehran and Thakor, 2011), 
thereby acting as a creditor-friendly policy. Thus, CEOs paid with higher inside debt are more 
likely to opt for equity financing, and less likely to disburse cash in the form of stock repurchases 
and dividends. These results provide further evidence that inside debt is negatively associated 
with capital distributions to equity holders.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
8. Robustness Tests 
We conduct additional tests to evaluate the robustness of our results. The results of these 
robustness tests are displayed in Panels A to C of Table 6. First, we test if the results are 
sensitive to our measure of inside debt incentives. Specifically, we adopt a simple definition to 
capture the relative incentives created by equity-based compensation and inside debt through the 
CEO debt-to-equity ratio. Intuitively, this measure captures the relative fraction of inside debt 
and equity in the wealth of a CEO.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Next, we test if the results are affected if we employ a different measure of repurchases. We 
do this by following Cuny et al.’s (2009) measure of repurchases which adjusts the consolidated 
repurchase measure on Compustat to decreases in the redemption value of preferred stock. 
Finally, we also adopt Hirtle’s (2004) definition of repurchases which includes gross treasury 
stock purchases and is as reported in the FRY 9C bank regulatory reports.  
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The results of these robustness tests present evidence in support of our primary analyses. Our 
finding that inside debt is negatively associated with bank payouts is not sensitive to a different 
specification of inside debt or to the alternative measurements of repurchases.  
9. Conclusions 
This paper assesses the role of debt-based CEO compensation in affecting risk-shifting 
behavior by examining bank payout policy choices. Bank payouts offer an ideal setting, because 
payouts result in distributing the bank’s most liquid assets to shareholders, while depleting the 
capital available to debt holders by reducing the amount of retained earnings (through dividends) 
or the amount of equity capital outstanding (through share repurchases). Thus, higher bank 
payouts result in increasing equity holder wealth, while adversely affecting debt holders. 
If higher payouts result in decreasing the bank’s equity capital base, such payouts may result 
in increasing bank risk. Since shareholders hold convex claims over firm assets, shareholder 
payoffs increase with risk which causes shareholders to prefer higher payouts. In this paper, we 
examine whether CEO pay incentives can mitigate these risk-shifting incentives. Specifically, 
our objective is to investigate the extent to which paying CEOs with ‘debt’ helps to align a 
bank’s payout choices with creditor preferences. 
Our results show that debt-based compensation can help address risk-shifting concerns by 
aligning the interests of CEOs with those of creditors, regulators, and ultimately taxpayers who 
may have to fund bank bailouts. We find that CEOs with higher inside debt relative to inside 
equity are associated with more conservative bank payout policies. Specifically, higher CEO 
inside debt is associated with a reduction in payouts. Further, our results for the subsample of 
TARP banks are very similar. CEOs at TARP banks with larger holdings of inside debt are less 
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likely to distribute capital to equity holders. Next, we also show that inside debt affects both 
components of payout, i.e. inside debt reduces both the amount of dividends and share 
repurchases. Finally, CEOs with higher inside debt holding raise more funds raised through new 
equity issues. 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that inside debt is an effective instrument 
to curb CEOs’ risk-seeking behavior. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction advanced 
in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011) that, as the ratio of CEOs debt-based 
to equity-based compensation increases, managerial incentives to expropriate creditors’ wealth 
are dampened.  
The main implication deriving from our paper is that the incentive effects associated with 
inside debt holdings by CEOs should find wider recognition both in applied empirical work on 
compensation, and amongst policymakers. As regards empirical work, most studies to date do 
not explicitly consider CEO inside debt holdings and focus instead exclusively on the 
implications of equity-based pay incentives. While earlier work was not able to access data on 
CEO inside debt holdings, this has changed since 2006 with the advent of wider SEC disclosure 
requirements on executive pensions and deferred compensation. However, not all recent studies 
on executive compensation that use post-2006 data include debt-based forms of compensation in 
their analysis. Our study shows that inside debt is economically substantial in banking (debt-
based CEO wealth is almost at the same level as equity-based CEO wealth) and that it has 
measureable implications for bank payouts. Therefore, future research on the incentive effects of 
CEO compensation arrangements should incorporate debt-based compensation arrangements to 
obtain a holistic view of the various incentives resulting from CEO compensation arrangements. 
Relatedly, the use of long-term deferred equity has been advocated as leading to CEO 
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conservatism. It may be interesting to explore the impact of long-term deferred equity and assess 
the commonalities between deferred equity and inside debt in future work. 
Further, the role of inside debt in curbing bank risk-taking should find wider recognition 
amongst policy makers. It is a widely held view that large equity-based risk-taking incentives 
have caused risky bank policies before the financial crisis and are one of the many factors which 
have contributed to the severity of the recent crisis. Recent U.S. compensation guidelines for 
CEOs and other senior executives at large banks by the Board of Governors et al. (2010) 
acknowledge the role of equity-based compensation arrangements in the crisis and suggest that a 
larger share of compensation should be deferred.  
However, recent U.S. compensation guidelines fall short of explicitly endorsing inside debt 
as a mechanism to mitigate excessive risk taking in banking. This is in contrast to European 
policy discussions which are aimed at turning more bank employees into holders of inside debt 
(see Liikanen Report, 2012). Our results, by showing that inside debt is effective in mitigating 
risk-shifting at TARP banks, support a more widespread use of inside debt in managerial 
compensation contracts. Our work should be interpreted as part of a wider body of research 
which demonstrates that inside debt matters for bank risk-taking and should be recognized as 
such much more widely in U.S. policy discussions on compensation incentives in banking.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for full sample. The sample period is 2007-2011. CEO compensation variables are lagged by one year, while other explanatory variables are contemporaneous. Total payouts 
is the sum of cash dividends and share repurchases. Net payouts is the sum of cash dividends and share repurchases minus proceeds from new equity issues. 
Variable  N Mean Median Std 
Dev. 
25
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile 
∆Total Payouts≥0 1 = Change in total payouts over prior year is non-negative; 0 = otherwise 442 0.514 1.000 - - - 
∆Net Payouts≥0 1 = Change in net payouts over prior year is non-negative; 0 = otherwise 442 0.500 0.500 - - - 
Magnitude of change in total payouts Change in total payouts, deflated by lagged book value of assets (%) 442 0.019 0 0.965 -0.369 0.165 
Magnitude of change in net payouts Change in net payouts, deflated by lagged book value of assets (%) 442 -0.058 0 1.424 -0.687 0.539 
CEO Debt-to-equity ratio (absolute) CEO inside debt / CEO inside equity 442 0.567 0.212 0.802 0.026 0.757 
CEO Debt-to-equity ratio  Natural log of (1 + CEO inside debt / CEO inside equity) 442 0.354 0.192 0.404 0.025 0.564 
CEO-bank debt-to-equity (absolute) CEO’s inside debt-to-inside equity, scaled by the value of a bank’s debt-to-equity 442 0.076 0.040 0.116 0.003 0.101 
CEO-bank debt-to-equity Natural log of (1 +  CEO’s inside debt-to-inside equity,  
scaled by the value of a bank’s debt-to-equity) 442 0.068 0.039 0.094 0.003 0.096 
CEO Vega Sensitivity of equity wealth to a 1 unit change in stock  
volatility, scaled by total CEO compensation 442 0.025 0.015 0.052 0.004 0.032 
CEO Delta Sensitivity of equity wealth to a 1 unit change in stock price,  
scaled by total CEO compensation 442 0.153 0.049 0.345 0.023 0.128 
Size Natural log of total assets 442 16.726 16.301 1.623 15.616 17.476 
Profitability Net income over equity 442 0.024 0.068 0.172 0.016 0.103 
Charter Value Market value of equity over book value of equity 442 1.029 1.011 0.142 0.972 1.052 
Cash Total Cash to total Assets 442 0.053 0.033 0.061 0.021 0.059 
Leverage Book value of liabilities over market value of equity, after logarithmic transformation 442 2.140 2.016 0.588 1.747 2.419 
Portfolio Risk Standard deviation of market value of assets, after logarithmic transformation 442 -2.881 -2.969 0.577 -3.249 -2.474 
CEO Age Age in years 442 56.652 56.000 6.521 52.000 61.000 
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Table 2: Binary Choice Analysis of Change in Payouts. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the change in bank payouts is non-negative (i.e. the bank did not reduce payouts), and 0 if 
there was a reduction in payouts. We run fixed-effects linear regressions for all models. The sample period is 2007-2011. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Year fixed effects are 
included for all models. Standard errors (clustered at bank level) are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 Total Payouts Net Payouts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag (CEO-bank debt-to-equity) -0.690** -0.664** -0.667* -0.770** -0.786** -0.789** 
 (0.337) (0.334) (0.337) (0.312) (0.317) (0.321) 
Lag (CEO Vega) -0.666 -0.589 -0.552 -0.560 -0.565 -0.536 
 (0.581) (0.593) (0.583) (0.633) (0.626) (0.615) 
Lag (CEO Delta) 0.065 0.052 0.052 0.063 0.063 0.063 
 (0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091) 
Size -0.141 -0.120 -0.100 -0.243 -0.225 -0.210 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.142) (0.170) (0.180) (0.181) 
Profitability 0.313 0.333 0.296 0.939** 0.970** 0.940** 
 (0.380) (0.391) (0.399) (0.408) (0.405) (0.417) 
Charter Value -0.674** -0.599** -0.581** -0.630* -0.637* -0.622* 
 (0.272) (0.273) (0.278) (0.325) (0.324) (0.330) 
Cash  1.390* 1.477*  -0.384 -0.315 
  (0.800) (0.811)  (0.933) (0.948) 
Leverage -0.304*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.051 -0.030 -0.030 
 (0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.095) (0.096) (0.097) 
Portfolio Risk  0.042 0.046  0.060 0.064 
  (0.056) (0.056)  (0.065) (0.066) 
CEO Age   -0.007   -0.005 
   (0.004)   (0.006) 
Lag (∆Total Payouts) -0.392*** -0.386*** -0.387***    
 (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)    
Lag (∆Net Payouts)    -0.341*** -0.337*** -0.337*** 
    (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) 
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.344 0.347 0.348 0.311 0.309 0.309 
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Table 3: Magnitude of Change in Total Payouts and Net Payouts. The dependent variable for models 1-3 is the difference between the total payouts (dividends + repurchases) over the prior 
year, deflated by the lagged book value of assets. For models 4-6, the dependent variable is the difference between net payouts (dividends + repurchases - equity issues) over prior year, deflated 
by the lagged book value of assets. The sample period is 2007-2011. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. The equations are estimated with bank-specific fixed effects as well as year 
dummies. Standard errors (clustered at firm level) are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 Total Payouts Net Payouts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag (CEO-bank debt-to-equity) -1.473* -1.386* -1.386* -1.969** -2.106** -2.106** 
 (0.750) (0.709) (0.711) (0.834) (0.853) (0.854) 
Lag (CEO Vega) -1.836 -1.749 -1.741 -0.592 -0.837 -0.832 
 (1.513) (1.565) (1.563) (1.590) (1.640) (1.639) 
Lag (CEO Delta) 0.003 -0.007 -0.007 0.089 0.125 0.124 
 (0.199) (0.206) (0.206) (0.254) (0.273) (0.274) 
Size -0.574* -0.612* -0.608* -0.556 -0.566 -0.563 
 (0.309) (0.319) (0.317) (0.643) (0.656) (0.662) 
Profitability -0.096 -0.126 -0.131 1.575* 1.558** 1.554* 
 (0.328) (0.328) (0.328) (0.837) (0.781) (0.791) 
Charter Value -4.123*** -4.051*** -4.049*** -4.461* -4.671** -4.669** 
 (1.235) (1.173) (1.173) (2.251) (2.179) (2.178) 
Cash  2.249 2.268  -5.111 -5.097 
  (2.167) (2.198)  (3.230) (3.267) 
Leverage -0.729*** -0.807*** -0.807*** 0.035 0.137 0.136 
 (0.202) (0.231) (0.232) (0.418) (0.462) (0.463) 
Portfolio Risk  -0.148 -0.147  0.050 0.051 
  (0.137) (0.137)  (0.226) (0.222) 
CEO Age   -0.001   -0.001 
   (0.010)   (0.019) 
Lag (Magnitude of change in Total Payout) -0.614*** -0.618*** -0.618***    
 (0.096) (0.092) (0.092)    
Lag (Magnitude of change in Net Payout)    -0.531*** -0.538*** -0.538*** 
    (0.078) (0.083) (0.083) 
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363 0.365 0.363 0.315 0.320 0.318 
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Table 4: Impact of TARP on bank payouts. This table reports regression estimates from a treatment effects model which estimates the impact of TARP on payouts. The dependent variable for 
models 1-2 and 5-6 is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the change in payouts is non-negative (i.e. no reduction in payouts), and 0 if the change in payouts is negative (i.e. reduction 
in payouts). For the remaining models, the dependent variable is change in payouts, deflated by the lagged book value of assets. For models 3-4 and 7-8, dependent variable is the change in total 
(net) payouts over prior year, scaled by the lagged book value of assets. TARP is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank was provided TARP for years 2009-2011. We readjust the value of 
TARP dummy after each year to take into account banks which repaid TARP. TARP is instrumented as the predicted likelihood that a bank remains under TARP. We follow Bayatizova and 
Shivdasani (2011) to construct our control variables. We use three instruments: the campaign contributions during the election cycle for the 2008 to the members of the Financial Institutions and 
Capital Markets Subcommittees of the House Financial Services Committee; the number of representative who sat on either of the two sub-committees who represented the same congressional 
district where the bank was headquartered; and change in state coincident index (weighted according to the level of bank deposits). The first-stage regressions are shown in Appendix C. We 
remove observations where the banks’ headquarters could not be matched with a congressional district. The sample period is 2007-2011. Variable definitions are given in Table 1. The equations 
are estimated with bank fixed effects as well as year dummies. Standard errors (clustered at firm level) are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. 
 Total Payouts Net Payouts 
 Likelihood Magnitude Likelihood Magnitude 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
TARP -0.236 -0.061 -0.428 -0.130 -0.016 0.085 -0.167 -0.018 
 (0.250) (0.265) (0.313) (0.307) (0.235) (0.240) (0.810) (0.835) 
TARP × Lag(CEO-bank debt-to-equity)  -2.835***  -4.802***  -1.625  -2.395 
  (0.942)  (1.269)  (1.148)  (2.573) 
Lag (CEO-bank debt-to-equity) -0.674* -0.306 -1.613** -0.985* -0.850*** -0.641* -2.170** -1.860* 
 (0.340) (0.318) (0.719) (0.564) (0.313) (0.367) (0.865) (0.962) 
         
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 418 
Adjusted R-squared 0.364 0.380 0.370 0.379 0.323 0.326 0.307 0.307 
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Table 5: Component of Payouts. For models 1-3, the dependent variable takes the value 0 if a bank reduced the payout component of interest in the next year, and 1 otherwise. Dependent 
variable in the remaining models is the change in the payout component (dividends, repurchases, or equity issues), deflated by the lagged book value of assets. Sample period is 2007-2011. 
Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Equation is estimated with bank-specific fixed effects as well as year dummies. Standard errors (clustered at firm level) are shown in brackets. *, **, 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 Likelihood of Increase in Payouts Magnitude of Change in Payouts 
 Dividends Repurchases Equity Issuances Dividends Repurchases Equity Issuances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag (CEO-bank debt-to-equity) -0.741** -0.074 -0.540 -0.127** -1.190* 1.090* 
 (0.310) (0.413) (0.350) (0.058) (0.676) (0.648) 
Lag (CEO Vega, scaled) -0.043 -1.479* -1.946*** 0.331* -2.877* -0.863 
 (0.795) (0.767) (0.729) (0.179) (1.652) (1.118) 
Lag (CEO Delta, scaled) -0.049 0.077 0.040 -0.013 0.152 -0.161 
 (0.102) (0.097) (0.115) (0.027) (0.206) (0.183) 
Size -0.196 -0.203 0.119 0.009 -0.585** 0.027 
 (0.156) (0.200) (0.196) (0.027) (0.273) (0.485) 
Profitability 0.452* 0.092 -0.396 0.098** -0.285 -1.637*** 
 (0.247) (0.171) (0.266) (0.044) (0.262) (0.618) 
Charter Value 0.949* -1.045*** 0.519* 0.174** -4.840*** -0.110 
 (0.507) (0.240) (0.281) (0.085) (0.981) (0.982) 
Cash 2.064** 1.426* 0.252 0.420*** 0.144 8.157*** 
 (0.871) (0.852) (0.792) (0.157) (1.482) (1.826) 
Leverage -0.093 -0.151 -0.054 -0.037* -0.738*** -1.032*** 
 (0.105) (0.091) (0.099) (0.020) (0.186) (0.290) 
Portfolio Risk 0.008 0.088 -0.020 -0.032** -0.034 -0.126 
 (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.012) (0.123) (0.160) 
CEO Age -0.015*** -0.008 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.010) (0.015) 
Lag (Payouts) -0.116*** -0.363*** -0.279*** -0.112*** -0.703*** -0.651*** 
 (0.044) (0.053) (0.059) (0.041) (0.049) (0.058) 
       
Observations 442 442 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.334 0.330 0.144 0.448 0.424 0.419 
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Table 6: Robustness Check: Replicating prior analysis by using alternate measures of pay and repurchases. Panel A uses an alternative measure of inside debt (CEO debt-to-equity ratio) to 
estimate the impact of inside debt on bank payout policy. Panel B follows Cuny et al.’s (2009) payouts measure where repurchases are adjusted to changes in redemption value of preferred stock 
and Panel C uses Hirtle’s measure of bank repurchases, as stated in bank regulatory reports.  Variable definitions are given in Table 1. Equation is estimated with bank-specific fixed effects as 
well as year dummies. Standard errors (clustered at firm level) are shown in brackets. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively 
 Total Payouts Net Payouts 
 (1): Likelihood (2): Magnitude (3): Likelihood (4): Magnitude 
Panel A: Alternative Measure of Inside Debt     
Lag (CEO debt-to-equity) -0.317*** -0.572*** -0.310*** -0.907*** 
 (0.095) (0.204) (0.095) (0.288) 
Lag (CEO Vega, scaled) -0.638 -1.878 -0.556 -1.067 
 (0.574) (1.610) (0.627) (1.757) 
Lag (CEO Delta, scaled) 0.048 -0.028 0.057 0.090 
 (0.101) (0.199) (0.091) (0.278) 
Other Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.371 0.309 0.328 
     
Panel B: Alternative Measure of Payouts, following Cuny et al. (2009)  
Lag (CEO-bank debt-to-equity) -0.818** -0.559* -0.642** -1.142* 
 (0.317) (0.307) (0.306) (0.616) 
Lag (CEO Vega, scaled) -0.971 -0.782 -0.052 -0.338 
 (0.591) (0.859) (0.659) (1.387) 
Lag (CEO Delta, scaled) 0.103 0.091 0.088 0.258 
 (0.106) (0.159) (0.104) (0.231) 
Other Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.359 0.373 0.357 0.387 
     
Panel C: Alternative Measure of Payouts, following Hirtle’s repurchase measure (2004) 
Lag (CEO debt-to-equity ratio) -0.539* -0.379* -0.531* -1.404** 
 (0.313) (0.215) (0.320) (0.637) 
Lag (CEO Vega, scaled) 0.165 0.499 -0.029 1.448 
 (0.872) (0.498) (0.847) (1.455) 
Lag (CEO Delta, scaled) 0.118 0.031 0.192 0.142 
 (0.152) (0.084) (0.143) (0.275) 
Other Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 442 442 442 442 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363 0.461 0.353 0.414 
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Figure 1: Average Bank Payouts (dividends and repurchases) by bank holding companies in our sample, 2007 – 2011.  
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Appendix A: CEO Vega and Delta calculations 
We refer to the option-based risk incentive as Vega and define it as the dollar change (as 
opposed to the percentage change) in managerial wealth linked to a marginal change in the 
volatility of the underlying stock return (Guay, 1999). We refer to the pay-for-stock 
performance measure as Delta and define it as the change in dollar managerial wealth linked 
to a 1% change in the stock price.  
Option values are calculated using the Black-Scholes option pricing formula with the input 
variables (such as option exercise price and maturity) extracted from SEC filings and 
Execucomp. We use the past 60 month stock volatility for each stock
5
. We calculate the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth and stock volatility (Vega) and stock price (Delta) as follows:  
CEO Vega= ∂value/∂σ × 0.01= e-dT× N'(Z) × S√T × 0.01            (A.1) 
CEO Delta= ∂value/∂S × S/100 = e-dT×  N(Z) × S/100        (A.2) 
Where Z = (ln(S/X) + (rf- d + σ
2
/2)T)/(σ√T) and N'(x) is the normal density function: 
N' (x) = 1/√2π * e-sq(x)/2    (A.3) 
 
S is the price of underlying stock at fiscal year-end; X represents the exercise price of the 
option, σ is the annualized stock return volatility estimated over the past 60 months; rf is the 
natural log of 1 + risk-free rate with the interest rate adjusted according to the remaining life 
of the option; T is the remaining time to maturity (in years); and d is the natural log of 1 + 
expected dividend rate where dividend rate is calculated by using the 3 year average dividend 
yield. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
 We require at least 1 year of past stock data to be available for our banks. 
! 39!
Appendix B: Bank Portfolio Risk 
Our measure of asset volatility (σA) is based on Merton’s option pricing framework. With 
equity holders occupying a residual claim on the value of firm assets, their claim structure 
resembles the value of a call option which can be expressed as (Vassalou and Xing, 2004; 
Hillegeist et al., 2001) shown in equation A.1.  The equation involves two unknowns, market 
value of assets (VA) and asset volatility measure (σA). To solve for this, we follow Hillegeist 
et al. (2004) and adopt Newton Search algorithm to iteratively arrive at the final value of σA, 
by solving for the following system of non-linear equations:  
VE,t  =  VA,t N(d1,t) – Xt e
–rT
 N (d2,t)                         (B.1) 
σE= VA N(d1) σA/ VE                                                  (B.2) 
 
Where  
   d1,t = (ln (VA,t / X) + (r + (σ
2
A,t / 2))T ) / σA,tT                        (B.3) 
   d2,t= d1,t – σAT
0.5
                            (B.4) 
 
we calculate r as the risk-free rate on 1-year T-bill. Equation A.2 is also known as the optimal 
hedge equation, which shows the relationship between asset volatility and equity volatility.  
 
To calculate Distance-to-Default, the above procedure remains the same. We obtain values of 
asset volatility and market value of assets after solving A.1 and A.2. Following Gropp et al. 
(2006), we express DD as: 
 
 
 
      (B.5) 
 
 
 
where VA,t is the market value of assets, L is the book value of bank liabilities, σA,t is a 
measure of asset volatility calculated using the standard deviation of asset values, and T is set 
equal to 1. 
ln (VA,t / Lt) + (r – 0.5 σ
2
A,t)T 
σA,tT 
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Appendix C: Instrumental Variable Approach 
Table C.1: Determinants of TARP funds distribution. This table presents the first-stage results of our instrumental variable 
approach. Panel A presents probit estimates of the bank’s TARP decisions. The dependent variable is the TARP dummy 
which is equal to one if the bank received TARP funds. We re-adjust this measure to announcements of new banks’ which 
enter TARP or banks which exit TARP by repaying TARP funds. The sample period covers 2009-2011 period, starting from 
the year when TARP funds were distributed. As regards the instruments, we follow Duchin and Sosyura (2014), Li (2013), 
and Berger and Roman (2013) to identify three instruments based on the banks’ geography and political connectedness: the 
campaign contributions during the election cycle for the 2008 to the members of the Financial Institutions and Capital 
Markets Subcommittees of the House Financial Services Committee (%FIRE Contributions); the number of representatives 
who sat on either of the two sub-committees who represented the same congressional district where the bank was 
headquartered (Political Connections); and change in state coincident index, weighted according to the level of bank deposits 
(State Macro Index Growth). We collect data on campaign contributions from the Financial Services, Insurance, and Real 
Estate (FIRE) sector from the Center for Responsive Politics and standardize it by bank assets. Data on coincident index is 
retrieved from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia website. Following Bayatizova and Shivdasani (2012) and Li 
(2013), our control variables include the bank’s capital adequacy (Tier-1 Ratio and its squared term), asset quality (Loans 
past 90 days as a fraction of bank capital), profitability (Return on equity), cash (fraction of cash to bank assets), sensitivity 
to market risk (expressed as the fraction of loans to deposits), and bank size (natural logarithm of bank assets). The sample 
consists of lagged control variables. Panel B presents the results of F test of the hypothesis that coefficients on our 
instruments are jointly zero. 
Panel A: First-stage Probit Estimates (1) (2) (3) (4) 
%FIRE Contributions  1.022* 1.778** 1.864** 
  (0.567) (0.869) (0.895) 
Political Connections   -0.178 -0.203 
   (0.183) (0.183) 
State Macro Index Growth    -0.938** 
    (0.398) 
(Tier-1 Ratio)2 -158.5*** -160.6*** -160.600*** -160.000*** 
 (42.70) (42.62) (42.74) (42.23) 
Tier-1 Ratio 38.50*** 38.85*** 39.070*** 39.060*** 
 (11.06) (11.03) (11.07) (10.98) 
Asset  -1.773 -1.796 -1.860 -2.684* 
 (1.455) (1.448) (1.449) (1.603) 
Profitability 0.303 0.686 0.471 0.252 
 (3.125) (3.125) (3.113) (3.297) 
Cash -2.670 -2.539 -2.659 -2.297 
 (1.705) (1.708) (1.721) (1.789) 
Sensitivity to Market Risk  -0.031 -0.017 -0.007 0.004 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054) 
Bank Size -7.539*** -7.773*** -7.913*** -8.233*** 
 (0.855) (0.791) (0.814) (1.266) 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 1,054 1,054 1,054 997 
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,054 1,054 1,054 997 
Panel B: Validity of Instruments     
F test of all instruments being jointly zero - 3.17* 6.27** 11.71*** 
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